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谦之论坛预告|S?ren Overgaard:本浑厚在论与幻觉标题

发表时间:2019-05-19 | 不雅赏数: | 作者:

 

主讲人简介:

S?ren Overgaard教授,于丹麦奥尔胡斯年夜学(University of Aarhus)博士毕业(2002),现任丹麦哥本哈根年夜学“主体性研讨中央”副教授。Overgaard教授的变乱重要散布于现象学跟剖析哲学规模,比年来出力于感知哲学与社会认知方面的研讨,在现象学跟剖析哲学之内存在极高的影响跟声誉。现在他还担负“北欧现象学学会”(NoSP)的主席,哥本哈根年夜学博士奖学金评审委员会主席,担负现象学出名期刊Phenomenology and the Cogntive Sciences的编委会成员,也是Routledge Research in Phenomenology丛书的主编,并为众多国际主流期刊如Australasian Journal of Philosophy、Continental Philosophy Review、European Journal of Philosophy 等担负评审。Overgaard教授发表了50多篇主流期刊论文,另著有Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World(2004)、Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl(2007)等专著。

 

 

内容摘要:

Na?ve realism is the views that perceptual experiences in cases of veridical perception are essentially acquaintance relations with physical things and some of their properties. Many philosophers have argued that na?ve realism has difficulties accounting for illusions, that is, cases of genuine perception in which the perceived object seems to have properties it does not instantiate. According to a number of recent writers, however, na?ve realism has no problem accounting for illusion (Brewer 2011; Fish 2009; Genone 2014; Kalderon 2011; Phillips 2016).  The general argument is that in illusion, we experience things just as they are; there is no ‘misperception’, strictly speaking. Perception simply presents us with things and some of their properties. However, there is something misleading about the objects or property instantiations perceived in illusions. In virtue of perceptually relevant similarities between a non-F object seen in illusions and things that are F, the former has ‘the power to mislead us’ (Brewer 2006) into judging, believing, or being inclined to judge or believe, that it is F.  In my talk, I argue that these recent proposals cannot account for illusion. For an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Only when an objects appears to have a property it does not have is there conflict between appearances and reality. Moreover, something can appear F without appearing to be F. When an object that is not-F appears F without appearing to be F, we do not have an illusion. I argue that the recent na?ve realist proposals can at best explain how an object that is not-F can appear F in a the latter, non-illusion-generating way.